welcome to the culture of death
-
-
- [Abstract]
- [Full text]
- [PDF]
- [Request permissions]
The arguments
-
- [Extract]
- [Full text]
- [PDF]
- [Request permissions]
FREE
-
- [Abstract]
- [Full text]
- [PDF]
- [Request permissions]
-
- [Abstract]
- [Full text]
- [PDF]
- [Request permissions]
-
- [Abstract]
- [Full text]
- [PDF]
- [Request permissions]
-
- [Abstract]
- [Full text]
- [PDF]
- [Request permissions]
-
- [Abstract]
- [Full text]
- [PDF]
- [Request permissions]
-
- [Abstract]
- [Full text]
- [PDF]
- [Request permissions]
-
- [Extract]
- [Full text]
- [PDF]
- [Request permissions]
-
- [Extract]
- [Full text]
- [PDF]
- [Request permissions]
-
- [Extract]
- [Full text]
- [PDF]
- [Request permissions]
Public policies
-
- [Abstract]
- [Full text]
- [PDF]
- [Request permissions]
-
- [Abstract]
- [Full text]
- [PDF]
- [Request permissions]
-
- [Abstract]
- [Full text]
- [PDF]
- [Request permissions]
-
- [Abstract]
- [Full text]
- [PDF]
- [Request permissions]
-
- [Abstract]
- [Full text]
- [PDF]
- [Request permissions]
Responses
-
- [Extract]
- [Full text]
- [PDF]
- [Request permissions]
-
- [Extract]
- [Full text]
- [PDF]
- [Request permissions]
-
- [Extract]
- [Full text]
- [PDF]
- [Request permissions]
-
- [Extract]
- [Full text]
- [PDF]
- [Request permissions]
-
- [Extract]
- [Full text]
- [PDF]
- [Request permissions]
-
- [Extract]
- [Full text]
- [PDF]
- [Request permissions]
-
- [Abstract]
- [Full text]
- [PDF]
- [Request permissions]
-
- [Abstract]
- [Full text]
- [PDF]
- [Request permissions]
-
- [Abstract]
- [Full text]
- [PDF]
- [Request permissions]
-
- [Abstract]
- [Full text]
- [PDF]
- [Request permissions]
-
- [Abstract]
- [Full text]
- [PDF]
- [Request permissions]
-
- [Abstract]
- [Full text]
- [PDF]
- [Request permissions]
-
- [Abstract]
- [Full text]
- [PDF]
- [Request permissions]
Mini-symposium on after-birth abortion
Electronic pages: Responses
-
- [Abstract]
- [Full text]
- [PDF]
- [Request permissions]
-
- [Abstract]
- [Full text]
- [PDF]
- [Request permissions]
-
Why should the baby live? Human right to life and the precautionary principle
- Correspondence to Dr Benedetto Rocchi, Department of Economics and Management, Vua delle Pandette, 32, 50127 Florence, Italy; benedetto.rocchi@unifi.it
- Received 16 April 2012
- Revised 29 December 2012
- Accepted 31 January 2013
Abstract
This paper discusses the issue of ‘post-birth abortion’ from an applied perspective. Three hypothetical situations where a newborn considered as a ‘potential person’ is at risk of being killed are proposed to highlight the potential controversial outcomes of post-birth abortion. The internal consistency of the argument proposed by Giubilini and Minerva to morally justify newborn killing is contested as well. Finally, an alternative moral strategy based on the precautionary principle and excluding any distinction between potential and actual persons is proposed as rational.- [Abstract]
- [Full text]
- [PDF]
- [Request permissions]
-
The basic human experience of the atrocities in the first half of the 20th century has significantly strengthened the recognition of human dignity and human rights for all born people at the political level. Therefore, the Charter of the United Nations in 1945 and its Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, Article 1 affirms: ‘All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights’. This article provides an ethical justification of why we in this political consensus should not waver, and why we should grant the right to life to all born human infants. Moreover, there is an ethical justification to granting the right to life even to unborn human beings, who already bear a human face.
- [Abstract]
- [Full text]
- [PDF]
- [Request permissions]
-
Two notable limitations exist on the use of personhood arguments in establishing moral status. Firstly, although the attribution of personhood may give us sufficient reason to grant something moral status, it is not a necessary condition. Secondly, even if a person is that which has the ‘highest’ moral status, this does not mean that any interests of a person are justifiable grounds to kill something that has a ‘lower’ moral status. Additional justification is needed to overcome a basic wrongness associated with killing something possessing moral status. There are clear arguments already available in this regard in the case of a foetus that are not available in the case of a newborn infant. Hence, there is scope to consistently hold that abortion may be permissible but that after-birth abortion may not be permissible.
- [Abstract]
- [Full text]
- [PDF]
- [Request permissions]
-
- [Abstract]
- [Full text]
- [PDF]
- [Request permissions]
Killing fetuses and killing newborns
- Correspondence to Dr Ezio Di Nucci, Universität Duisburg-Essen, Institut für Philosophie, Essen 45117, Germany; ezio.dinucci@uni-due.de
- Received 4 March 2012
- Revised 28 May 2012
- Accepted 4 February 2013
Abstract
The argument for the moral permissibility of killing newborns is a challenge to liberal positions on abortion because it can be considered a reductio of their defence of abortion. Here I defend the liberal stance on abortion by arguing that the argument for the moral permissibility of killing newborns on ground of the social, psychological and economic burden on the parents recently put forward by Giubilini and Minerva is not valid; this is because they fail to show that newborns cannot be harmed and because there are morally relevant differences between fetuses and newborns.

PHILIPPINE BISHOPS BLOGS



